Additions to the Framework

This proposal defines the following enhancements to Noise_IK_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA256. These generally follow the guidelines in [NOISE] section 13.

1. Cleartext ephemeral keys are encoded with [Elligator2].
2. The reply is prefixed with a cleartext tag.
3. The payload format is defined for messages 1, 2, and the data phase. Of course, this is not defined in Noise.

All messages include an [I2NP] Garlic Message header. The data phase uses encryption similar to, but not compatible with, the Noise data phase.

Session Context

As with ElGamal/AES+SessionTags, all inbound and outbound sessions must be in a given context, either the router's context or the context for a particular local destination. In Java I2P, this context is called the Session Key Manager.

Sessions must not be shared among contexts, as that would allow correlation among the various local destinations, or between a local destination and a router.

When a given destination supports both ElGamal/AES+SessionTags and this proposal, both types of sessions may share a context. See section 1c) below.

Pairing Inbound and Outbound Sessions

When an outbound session is created at the originator (Alice), a new inbound session is created and paired with the outbound session, unless no reply is expected (e.g. raw datagrams).

A new inbound session is always paired with a new outbound session, unless no reply is requested (e.g. raw datagrams).

If a reply is requested and bound to a far-end destination or router, that new outbound session is bound to that destination or router, and replaces any previous outbound session to that destination or router.

Pairing inbound and outbound sessions provides a bidirectional protocol with the capability of ratcheting the DH keys.

Binding Sessions and Destinations

There is only one outbound session to a given destination or router. There may be several current inbound sessions from a given destination or router. Generally, when a new inbound session is created, and traffic is received on that session (which serves as an ACK), any others will be marked to expire relatively quickly, within a minute or so. The previous messages sent (PN) value is checked, and if there are no unreceived messages (within the window size) in the previous inbound session, the previous session may be deleted immediately.

When an outbound session is created at the originator (Alice), it is bound to the far-end Destination (Bob), and any paired inbound session will also be bound to the far-end Destination. As the sessions ratchet, they continue to be bound to the far-end Destination.

When an inbound session is created at the receiver (Bob), it may be bound to the far-end Destination (Alice), at Alice's option. If Alice includes binding information (her static key) in the New Session message, the session will be bound to that destination, and a outbound session will be created and bound to same Destination. As the sessions ratchet, they continue to be bound to the far-end Destination.

Benefits of Binding and Pairing

For the common, streaming case, we expect Alice and Bob to use the protocol as follows:

• Alice pairs her new outbound session to a new inbound session, both bound to the far-end destination (Bob).
• Alice includes the binding information and signature, and a reply request, in the New Session message sent to Bob.
• Bob pairs his new inbound session to a new outbound session, both bound to the far-end destination (Alice).
• Bob sends a reply (ack) to Alice in the paired session, with a ratchet to a new DH key.
• Alice ratchets to a new outbound session with Bob's new key, paired to the existing inbound session.

By binding an inbound session to a far-end Destination, and pairing the inbound session to an outbound session bound to the same Destination, we achieve two major benefits:

1. The initial reply from Bob to Alice uses ephemeral-ephemeral DH

2) After Alice receives Bob's reply and ratchets, all subsequent messages from Alice to Bob use ephemeral-ephemeral DH.

Message ACKs

In ElGamal/AES+SessionTags, when a LeaseSet is bundled as a garlic clove, or tags are delivered, the sending router requests an ACK. This is a separate garlic clove containing a DeliveryStatus Message. For additional security, the DeliveryStatus Message is wrapped in a Garlic Message. This mechanism is out-of-band from the perspective of the protocol.

In the new protocol, since the inbound and outbound sessions are paired, we can have ACKs in-band. No separate clove is required.

An explicit ACK is simply an Existing Session message with no I2NP block. However, in most cases, an explict ACK can be avoided, as there is reverse traffic. It may be desirable for implementations to wait a short time (perhaps a hundred ms) before sending an explicit ACK, to give the streaming or application layer time to respond.

Implementations will also need to defer any ACK sending until after the I2NP block is processed, as the Garlic Message may contain a Database Store Message with a lease set. A recent lease set will be necessary to route the ACK, and the far-end destination (contained in the lease set) will be necessary to verify the binding static key.

Session Timeouts

Outbound sessions should always expire before inbound sessions. One an outbound session expires, and a new one is created, a new paired inbound session will be created as well. If there was an old inbound session, it will be allowed to expire.

Review of Current Message Format

The Garlic Message as specified in [I2NP] is as follows. As a design goal is that intermediate hops cannot distinguish new from old crypto, this format cannot change, even though the length field is redundant. The format is shown with the full 16-byte header, although the actual header may be in a different format, depending on the transport used.

When decrypted the data contains a series of Garlic Cloves and additional data, also known as a Clove Set.

See [I2NP] for details and a full specification.

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|type|      msg_id       |  expiration
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
                         |  size   |chks|
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|      length       |                   |
+----+----+----+----+                   +
|          encrypted data               |
~                                       ~
~                                       ~
|                                       |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+

Review of Encrypted Data Format

The current message format, used for over 15 years, is ElGamal/AES+SessionTags. In ElGamal/AES+SessionTags, there are two message formats:

1) New session: - 514 byte ElGamal block - AES block (128 bytes minimum, multiple of 16)

2) Existing session: - 32 byte Session Tag - AES block (128 bytes minimum, multiple of 16)

The minimum padding to 128 is as implemented in Java I2P but is not enforced on reception.

These messages are encapsulated in a I2NP garlic message, which contains a length field, so the length is known.

Note that there is no padding defined to a non-mod-16 length, so the New Session is always (mod 16 == 2), and an Existing Session is always (mod 16 == 0). We need to fix this.

The receiver first attempts to look up the first 32 bytes as a Session Tag. If found, he decrypts the AES block. If not found, and the data is at least (514+16) long, he attempts to decrypt the ElGamal block, and if successful, decrypts the AES block.

New Session Tags and Comparison to Signal

In Signal Double Ratchet, the header contains:

• DH: Current ratchet public key
• PN: Previous chain message length
• N: Message Number

Signal's "sending chains" are roughly equivalent to our tag sets. By using a session tag, we can eliminate most of that.

In New Session, we put only the public key in the unencrytped header.

In Existing Session, we use a session tag for the header. The session tag is associated with the current ratchet public key, and the message number.

In both new and Existing Session, PN and N are in the encrypted body.

In Signal, things are constantly ratcheting. A new DH public key requires the receiver to ratchet and send a new public key back, which also serves as the ack for the received public key. This would be far too many DH operations for us. So we separate the ack of the received key and the transmission of a new public key. Any message using a session tag generated from the new DH public key constitutes an ACK. We only transmit a new public key when we wish to rekey.

The maximum number of messages before the DH must ratchet is 65535.

When delivering a session key, we derive the "Tag Set" from it, rather than having to deliver session tags as well. A Tag Set can be up to 65536 tags. However, receivers should implement a "look-ahead" strategy, rather than generating all possible tags at once. Only generate at most N tags past the last good tag received. N might be at most 128, but 32 or even less may be a better choice.

New Session Ephemeral Key

The ephemeral key is 32 bytes, encoded with Elligator2. This key is never reused; a new key is generated with each message, including retransmissions.

Static Key

When decryptied, Alice's X25519 static key, 32 bytes.

Payload

Encrypted length is the remainder of the data. Decrypted length is 16 less than the encrypted length. Payload must contain a DateTime block and will usually contain one or more Garlic Clove blocks. See the payload section below for format and additional requirements.

New Session Ephemeral Key

Alice's ephemeral key. The ephemeral key is 32 bytes, encoded with Elligator2, little endian. This key is never reused; a new key is generated with each message, including retransmissions.

Flags Section Decrypted data

The Flags section contains nothing. It is always 32 bytes, because it must be the same length as the static key for New Session messages with binding. Bob determines whether it's a static key or a flags section by testing if the 32 bytes are all zeros.

TODO any flags needed here?

Payload

Encrypted length is the remainder of the data. Decrypted length is 16 less than the encrypted length. Payload must contain a DateTime block and will usually contain one or more Garlic Clove blocks. See the payload section below for format and additional requirements.

New Session One Time Key

The one time key is 32 bytes, encoded with Elligator2, little endian. This key is never reused; a new key is generated with each message, including retransmissions.

Flags Section Decrypted data

The Flags section contains nothing. It is always 32 bytes, because it must be the same length as the static key for New Session messages with binding. Bob determines whether it's a static key or a flags section by testing if the 32 bytes are all zeros.

TODO any flags needed here?

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|                                       |
+                                       +
|                                       |
+             All zeros                 +
|              32 bytes                 |
+                                       +
|                                       |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+

zeros:: All zeros, 32 bytes.

Payload

Encrypted length is the remainder of the data. Decrypted length is 16 less than the encrypted length. Payload must contain a DateTime block and will usually contain one or more Garlic Clove blocks. See the payload section below for format and additional requirements.

KDF for Initial ChainKey

This is standard [NOISE] for IK with a modified protocol name. Note that we use the same initializer for both the IK pattern (bound sessions) and for N pattern (unbound sessions).

The protocol name is modified for two reasons. First, to indicate that the ephemeral keys are encoded with Elligator2, and second, to indicate that MixHash() is called before the second message to mix in the tag value.

This is the "e" message pattern:

// Define protocol_name.
Set protocol_name = "Noise_IKelg2+hs2_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA256"
 (40 bytes, US-ASCII encoded, no NULL termination).

// Define Hash h = 32 bytes
h = SHA256(protocol_name);

Define ck = 32 byte chaining key. Copy the h data to ck.
Set chainKey = h

// MixHash(null prologue)
h = SHA256(h);

// up until here, can all be precalculated by Alice for all outgoing connections

KDF for Flags/Static Key Section Encrypted Contents

This is the "e" message pattern:

// Bob's X25519 static keys
// bpk is published in leaseset
bsk = GENERATE_PRIVATE()
bpk = DERIVE_PUBLIC(bsk)

// Bob static public key
// MixHash(bpk)
// || below means append
h = SHA256(h || bpk);

// up until here, can all be precalculated by Bob for all incoming connections

// Alice's X25519 ephemeral keys
aesk = GENERATE_PRIVATE_ELG2()
aepk = DERIVE_PUBLIC(aesk)

// Alice ephemeral public key
// MixHash(aepk)
// || below means append
h = SHA256(h || aepk);

// h is used as the associated data for the AEAD in the New Session Message
// Retain the Hash h for the New Session Reply KDF
// eapk is sent in cleartext in the
// beginning of the New Session message
elg2_aepk = ENCODE_ELG2(aepk)
// As decoded by Bob
aepk = DECODE_ELG2(elg2_aepk)

End of "e" message pattern.

This is the "es" message pattern:

// Noise es
sharedSecret = DH(aesk, bpk) = DH(bsk, aepk)

// MixKey(DH())
//[chainKey, k] = MixKey(sharedSecret)
// ChaChaPoly parameters to encrypt/decrypt
keydata = HKDF(chainKey, sharedSecret, "", 64)
chainKey = keydata[0:31]

// AEAD parameters
k = keydata[32:64]
n = 0
ad = h
ciphertext = ENCRYPT(k, n, flags/static key section, ad)

End of "es" message pattern.

This is the "s" message pattern:

// MixHash(ciphertext)
// Save for Payload section KDF
h = SHA256(h || ciphertext)

// Alice's X25519 static keys
ask = GENERATE_PRIVATE()
apk = DERIVE_PUBLIC(ask)

End of "s" message pattern.

KDF for Payload Section (with Alice static key)

This is the "ss" message pattern:

// Noise ss
sharedSecret = DH(ask, bpk) = DH(bsk, apk)

// MixKey(DH())
//[chainKey, k] = MixKey(sharedSecret)
// ChaChaPoly parameters to encrypt/decrypt
// chainKey from Static Key Section
Set sharedSecret = X25519 DH result
keydata = HKDF(chainKey, sharedSecret, "", 64)
chainKey = keydata[0:31]

// AEAD parameters
k = keydata[32:64]
n = 0
ad = h
ciphertext = ENCRYPT(k, n, payload, ad)

End of "ss" message pattern.

// MixHash(ciphertext)
// Save for New Session Reply KDF
h = SHA256(h || ciphertext)

KDF for Payload Section (without Alice static key)

Note that this is a Noise "N" pattern, but we use the same "IK" initializer as for bound sessions.

New Session essages can not be identified as containing Alice's static key or not until the static key is decrypted and inspected to determine if it contains all zeros. Therefore, the receiver must use the "IK" state machine for all New Session messages. If the static key is all zeros, the "ss" message pattern must be skipped.

chainKey = from Flags/Static key section
k = from Flags/Static key section
n = 1
ad = h from Flags/Static key section
ciphertext = ENCRYPT(k, n, payload, ad)

Session Tag

The tag is generated in the Session Tags KDF, as initialized in the DH Initialization KDF below. This correlates the reply to the session. The Session Key from the DH Initialization is not used.

New Session Reply Ephemeral Key

Bob's ephemeral key. The ephemeral key is 32 bytes, encoded with Elligator2, little endian. This key is never reused; a new key is generated with each message, including retransmissions.

Payload

Encrypted length is the remainder of the data. Decrypted length is 16 less than the encrypted length. Payload will usually contain one or more Garlic Clove blocks. See the payload section below for format and additional requirements.

KDF for Reply TagSet

One or more tags are created from the TagSet, which is initialized using the KDF below, using the chainKey from the New Session message.

// Generate tagset
tagsetKey = HKDF(chainKey, ZEROLEN, "SessionReplyTags", 32)
tagset_nsr = DH_INITIALIZE(chainKey, tagsetKey)

KDF for Reply Key Section Encrypted Contents

// Keys from the New Session message
// Alice's X25519 keys
// apk and aepk are sent in original New Session message
// ask = Alice private static key
// apk = Alice public static key
// aesk = Alice ephemeral private key
// aepk = Alice ephemeral public key
// Bob's X25519 static keys
// bsk = Bob private static key
// bpk = Bob public static key

// Generate the tag
tagsetEntry = tagset_nsr.GET_NEXT_ENTRY()
tag = tagsetEntry.SESSION_TAG

// MixHash(tag)
h = SHA256(h || tag)

This is the "e" message pattern:

// Bob's X25519 ephemeral keys
besk = GENERATE_PRIVATE_ELG2()
bepk = DERIVE_PUBLIC(besk)

// Bob's ephemeral public key
// MixHash(bepk)
// || below means append
h = SHA256(h || bepk);

// elg2_bepk is sent in cleartext in the
// beginning of the New Session message
elg2_bepk = ENCODE_ELG2(bepk)
// As decoded by Bob
bepk = DECODE_ELG2(elg2_bepk)

End of "e" message pattern.

This is the "ee" message pattern:

// MixKey(DH())
//[chainKey, k] = MixKey(sharedSecret)
// ChaChaPoly parameters to encrypt/decrypt
// chainKey from original New Session Payload Section
sharedSecret = DH(aesk, bepk) = DH(besk, aepk)
keydata = HKDF(chainKey, sharedSecret, "", 32)
chainKey = keydata[0:31]

End of "ee" message pattern.

This is the "se" message pattern:

// MixKey(DH())
//[chainKey, k] = MixKey(sharedSecret)
sharedSecret = DH(ask, bepk) = DH(besk, apk)
keydata = HKDF(chainKey, sharedSecret, "", 64)
chainKey = keydata[0:31]

// AEAD parameters
k = keydata[32:64]
n = 0
ad = h
ciphertext = ENCRYPT(k, n, ZEROLEN, ad)

End of "se" message pattern.

// MixHash(ciphertext)
h = SHA256(h || ciphertext)

chainKey is used in the ratchet below.

KDF for Payload Section Encrypted Contents

This is like the first Existing Session message, post-split, but without a separate tag. Additionally, we use the hash from above to bind the payload to the NSR message.

// split()
keydata = HKDF(chainKey, ZEROLEN, "", 64)
k_ab = keydata[0:31]
k_ba = keydata[32:63]
tagset_ab = DH_INITIALIZE(chainKey, k_ab)
tagset_ba = DH_INITIALIZE(chainKey, k_ba)

// AEAD parameters for New Session Reply payload
k = HKDF(k_ba, ZEROLEN, "AttachPayloadKDF", 32)
n = 0
ad = h
ciphertext = ENCRYPT(k, n, payload, ad)

Format

Encrypted:

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|       Session Tag                     |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|                                       |
+            Payload Section            +
|       ChaCha20 encrypted data         |
~                                       ~
|                                       |
+                                       +
|                                       |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|  Poly1305 Message Authentication Code |
+              (MAC)                    +
|             16 bytes                  |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+

Session Tag :: 8 bytes, cleartext

Payload data :: remaining data minus 16 bytes

MAC :: Poly1305 message authentication code, 16 bytes

Payload

Encrypted length is the remainder of the data. Decrypted length is 16 less than the encrypted length. See the payload section below for format and requirements.

KDF

See AEAD section below.

// AEAD parameters for Existing Session payload
k = The 32-byte session key associated with this session tag
n = The message number N in the current chain, as retrieved from the associated Session Tag.
ad = The session tag, 8 bytes
ciphertext = ENCRYPT(k, n, payload, ad)

Format

32-byte public and private keys. Encoded keys are little endian.

As defined in [Elligator2], the encoded keys are indistinguishable from 254 random bits. We require 256 random bits (32 bytes). Therefore, the encoding and decoding are defined as follows:

Encoding:

ENCODE_ELG2() Definition

// Encode as defined in Elligator2 specification
encodedKey = encode(pubkey)
// OR in 2 random bits to MSB
randomByte = CSRNG(1)
encodedKey[31] |= (randomByte & 0xc0)

Decoding:

DECODE_ELG2() Definition

// Mask out 2 random bits from MSB
encodedKey[31] &= 0x3f
// Decode as defined in Elligator2 specification
pubkey = decode(encodedKey)

Justification

Required to prevent the OBEP and IBGW from classifying traffic.

Notes

Elligator2 doubles average the key generation time, as half the private keys result in public keys that are unsuitable for encoding with Elligator2. Also, the key generation time is unbounded with an exponential distribution, as the generator must keep retrying utnil a suitable key pair is found.

This overhead may be managed by doing key generation in advance, in a separate thread, to keep a pool of suitable keys.

The generator does the ENCODE_ELG2() function to determine suitability. Therefore, the generator should store the result of ENCODE_ELG2() so it does not have to be calculated again.

Additionally, the unsuitable keys may be added to the pool of keys used for [NTCP2], where Elligator2 is not used. The security issues of doing so is TBD.

New Session and New Session Reply Inputs

Inputs to the encryption/decryption functions for an AEAD block in a New Session message:

k :: 32 byte cipher key
     See New Session and New Session Reply KDFs above.

n :: Counter-based nonce, 12 bytes.
     n = 0

ad :: Associated data, 32 bytes.
      The SHA256 hash of the preceding data, as output from mixHash()

data :: Plaintext data, 0 or more bytes

Existing Session Inputs

Inputs to the encryption/decryption functions for an AEAD block in an Existing Session message:

k :: 32 byte session key
     As looked up from the accompanying session tag.

n :: Counter-based nonce, 12 bytes.
     Starts at 0 and incremented for each message when transmitting.
     For the receiver, the value
     as looked up from the accompanying session tag.
     First four bytes are always zero.
     Last eight bytes are the message number (n), little-endian encoded.
     Maximum value is 65535.
     Session must be ratcheted when N reaches that value.
     Higher values must never be used.

ad :: Associated data
      The session tag

data :: Plaintext data, 0 or more bytes

Encrypted Format

Output of the encryption function, input to the decryption function:

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|                                       |
+                                       +
|       ChaCha20 encrypted data         |
~               .   .   .               ~
|                                       |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|  Poly1305 Message Authentication Code |
+              (MAC)                    +
|             16 bytes                  |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+

encrypted data :: Same size as plaintext data, 0 - 65519 bytes

MAC :: Poly1305 message authentication code, 16 bytes

Notes

• Since ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, plaintexts need not be padded. Additional keystream bytes are discarded.
• The key for the cipher (256 bits) is agreed upon by means of the SHA256 KDF. The details of the KDF for each message are in separate sections below.
• ChaChaPoly frames are of known size as they are encapsulated in the I2NP data message.
• For all messages, padding is inside the authenticated data frame.

AEAD Error Handling

All received data that fails the AEAD verification must be discarded. No response is returned.

Justification

Used in [NTCP2].

Message Numbers

The Double Ratchet handles lost or out-of-order messages by including in each message header a tag. The receiver looks up the index of the tag, this is the message number N. If the message contains a Message Number block with a PN value, the recipient can delete any tags higher than that value in the previous tag set, while retaining skipped tags from the previous tag set in case the skipped messages arrive later.

Sample Implementation

We define the following data structures and functions to implement these ratchets.

TAGSET_ENTRY

A single entry in a TAGSET.

INDEX

An integer index, starting with 0

SESSION_TAG

An identifier to go out on the wire, 8 bytes

SESSION_KEY

A symmetric key, never goes on the wire, 32 bytes

TAGSET

A collection of TAGSET_ENTRIES.

CREATE(key, n)

Generate a new TAGSET using initial cryptographic key material of 32 bytes. The associated session identifier is provided. The initial number of of tags to create is specified; this is generally 0 or 1 for an outgoing session. LAST_INDEX = -1 EXTEND(n) is called.

EXTEND(n)

Generate n more TAGSET_ENTRIES by calling EXTEND() n times.

EXTEND()

Generate one more TAGSET_ENTRY, unless the maximum number SESSION_TAGS have already been generated. If LAST_INDEX is greater than or equal to 65535, return. ++ LAST_INDEX Create a new TAGSET_ENTRY with the LAST_INDEX value and the calculated SESSION_TAG. Calls RATCHET_TAG() and (optionally) RATCHET_KEY(). For inbound sessions, the calculation of the SESSION_KEY may be deferred and calculated in GET_SESSION_KEY(). Calls EXPIRE()

EXPIRE()

Remove tags and keys that are too old, or if the TAGSET size exceeds some limit.

RATCHET_TAG()

Calculates the next SESSION_TAG based on the last SESSION_TAG.

RATCHET_KEY()

Calculates the next SESSION_KEY based on the last SESSION_KEY.

SESSION

The associated session.

CREATION_TIME

When the TAGSET was created.

LAST_INDEX

The last TAGSET_ENTRY INDEX generated by EXTEND().

GET_NEXT_ENTRY()

Used for outgoing sessions only. EXTEND(1) is called if there are no remaining TAGSET_ENTRIES. If EXTEND(1) did nothing, the max of 65535 TAGSETS have been used, and return an error. Returns the next unused TAGSET_ENTRY.

GET_SESSION_KEY(sessionTag)

Used for incoming sessions only. Returns the TAGSET_ENTRY containing the sessionTag. If found, the TAGSET_ENTRY is removed. If the SESSION_KEY calculation was deferred, it is calculated now. If there are few TAGSET_ENTRIES remaining, EXTEND(n) is called.

4a) DH Ratchet

Ratchets but not nearly as fast as Signal does. We separate the ack of the received key from generating the new key. In typical usage, Alice and Bob will each ratchet (twice) immediately in a New Session, but will not ratchet again.

Note that a ratchet is for a single direction, and generates a New Session tag / message key ratchet chain for that direction. To generate keys for both directions, you have to ratchet twice.

You ratchet every time you generate and send a new key. You ratchet every time you receive a new key.

Alice ratchets once when creating an unbound outbound session, she does not create an inbound session (unbound is non-repliable).

Bob ratchets once when creating an unbound inbound session, and does not create a corresponding outbound session (unbound is non-repliable).

Alice continues sending New Session (NS) messages to Bob until receiving one of Bob's New Session Reply (NSR) messages. She then uses the NSR's Payload Section KDF results as inputs for the session ratchets (see DH Ratchet KDF), and begins sending Existing Session (ES) messages.

For each NS message received, Bob creates a new inbound session, using the KDF results of the reply Payload Section for inputs to the new inbound and outbound ES DH Ratchet.

For each reply required, Bob sends Alice a NSR message with the reply in the payload. It is required Bob use new ephemeral keys for every NSR.

Bob must receive an ES message from Alice on one of the inbound sessions, before creating and sending ES messages on the corresponding outbound session.

Alice should use a timer for receiving a NSR message from Bob. If the timer expires, the session should be removed.

To avoid a KCI and/or resource exhaustion attack, where an attacker drops Bob's NSR replies to keep Alice sending NS messages, Alice should avoid starting New Sessions to Bob after a certain number of retries due to timer expiration.

Alice and Bob each do a DH ratchet for every NextKey block received.

Alice and Bob each generate new tag setstchets and two symmetric keys ratchets after each DH ratchet. For each new ES message in a given direction, Alice and Bob advance the session tag and symmtric key ratchets.

The frequency of DH ratchets after the initial handshake is implementation-dependent. While the protocol places a limit of 65535 messages before a ratchet is required, more frequent ratcheting (based on message count, elapsed time, or both) may provide additional security.

After the final handshake KDF on bound sessions, Bob and Alice must run the Noise Split() function on the resulting CipherState to create independent symmetric and tag chain keys for inbound and outbound sessions.

Tag Sender                    Tag Receiver

                 ... use tag set #0 ...


(Tagset #0 almost empty)
(generate new key #0)

Next Key, forward, request reverse, with key #0  -------->
(repeat until next key received)

                            (generate new key #0, do DH, create IB Tagset #1)

        <-------------      Next Key, reverse, with key #0
                            (repeat until tag received on new tagset)

(do DH, create OB Tagset #1)


                 ... use tag set #1 ...


(Tagset #1 almost empty)
(generate new key #1)

Next Key, forward, with key #1        -------->
(repeat until next key received)

                            (reuse key #0, do DH, create IB Tagset #2)

        <--------------     Next Key, reverse, id 0
                            (repeat until tag received on new tagset)

(do DH, create OB Tagset #2)


                 ... use tag set #2 ...


(Tagset #2 almost empty)
(reuse key #1)

Next Key, forward, request reverse, id 1  -------->
(repeat until next key received)

                            (generate new key #1, do DH, create IB Tagset #3)

        <--------------     Next Key, reverse, with key #1

(do DH, create OB Tagset #3)
(reuse key #1, do DH, create IB Tagset #3)



                 ... use tag set #3 ...



     After tag set 3, repeat the above
     patterns as shown for tag sets 2 and 3.

     To create a new even-numbered tag set, the sender sends a new key
     to the receiver. The receiver sends his old key ID
     back as an acknowledgement.

     To create a new odd-numbered tag set, the sender sends a reverse request
     to the receiver. The receiver sends a new reverse key to the sender.

Inputs:
1) rootKey = chainKey from Payload Section
2) k from the New Session KDF or split()

// KDF_RK(rk, dh_out)
keydata = HKDF(rootKey, k, "KDFDHRatchetStep", 64)

// Output 1: The next Root Key (KDF input for the next DH ratchet)
nextRootKey = keydata[0:31]
// Output 2: The chain key to initialize the new
// session tag and symmetric key ratchets
// for the tag set
ck = keydata[32:63]

// session tag and symmetric key chain keys
keydata = HKDF(ck, ZEROLEN, "TagAndKeyGenKeys", 64)
sessTag_ck = keydata[0:31]
symmKey_ck = keydata[32:63]

// Tag sender generates new X25519 ephemeral keys
// and sends rapk to tag receiver in a NextKey block
rask = GENERATE_PRIVATE()
rapk = DERIVE_PUBLIC(rask)

// Tag receiver generates new X25519 ephemeral keys
// and sends rbpk to Tag sender in a NextKey block
rbsk = GENERATE_PRIVATE()
rbpk = DERIVE_PUBLIC(rbsk)

sharedSecret = DH(rask, rbpk) = DH(rbsk, rapk)
tagsetKey = HKDF(sharedSecret, ZEROLEN, "XDHRatchetTagSet", 32)
rootKey = nextRootKey // from previous tagset in this direction
newTagSet = DH_INITIALIZE(rootKey, tagsetKey)

4b) Session Tag Ratchet

Ratchets for every message, as in Signal. The session tag ratchet is synchronized with the symmetric key ratchet, but the receiver key ratchet may "lag behind" to save memory.

Transmitter ratchets once for each message transmitted. No additional tags must be stored. The transmitter must also keep a counter for 'N', the message number of the message in the current chain. The 'N' value is included in the sent message. See the Message Number block definition.

Receiver must ratchet ahead by the max window size and store the tags in a "tag set", which is associated with the session. Once received, the stored tag may be discarded, and if there are no previous unreceived tags, the window may be advanced. The receiver should keep the 'N' value associated with each session tag, and check that the number in the sent message matches this value. See the Message Number block definition.

Inputs:
1) Session Tag Chain key sessTag_ck
   First time: output from DH ratchet
   Subsequent times: output from previous session tag ratchet

Generated:
2) input_key_material = SESSTAG_CONSTANT
   Must be unique for this tag set (generated from chain key),
   so that the sequence isn't predictable, since session tags
   go out on the wire in plaintext.

Outputs:
1) N (the current session tag number)
2) the session tag (and symmetric key, probably)
3) the next Session Tag Chain Key (KDF input for the next session tag ratchet)

Initialization:
keydata = HKDF(sessTag_ck, ZEROLEN, "STInitialization", 64)
// Output 1: Next chain key
sessTag_chainKey = keydata[0:31]
// Output 2: The constant
SESSTAG_CONSTANT = keydata[32:63]

// KDF_ST(ck, constant)
keydata_0 = HKDF(sessTag_chainkey, SESSTAG_CONSTANT, "SessionTagKeyGen", 64)
// Output 1: Next chain key
sessTag_chainKey_0 = keydata_0[0:31]
// Output 2: The session tag
// or more if tag is longer than 8 bytes
tag_0 = keydata_0[32:39]

// repeat as necessary to get to tag_n
keydata_n = HKDF(sessTag_chainKey_(n-1), SESSTAG_CONSTANT, "SessionTagKeyGen", 64)
// Output 1: Next chain key
sessTag_chainKey_n = keydata_n[0:31]
// Output 2: The session tag
// or more if tag is longer than 8 bytes
tag_n = keydata_n[32:39]

4c) Symmetric Key Ratchet

Ratchets for every message, as in Signal. Each symmetric key has an associated message number and session tag. The session key ratchet is synchronized with the symmetric tag ratchet, but the receiver key ratchet may "lag behind" to save memory.

Transmitter ratchets once for each message transmitted. No additional keys must be stored.

When receiver gets a session tag, if it has not already ratcheted the symmetric key ratchet ahead to the associated key, it must "catch up" to the associated key. The receiver will probably cache the keys for any previous tags that have not yet been received. Once received, the stored key may be discarded, and if there are no previous unreceived tags, the window may be advanced.

For efficiency, the session tag and symmetric key ratchets are separate so the session tag ratchet can run ahead of the symmetric key ratchet. This also provides some additional security, since the session tags go out on the wire.

Inputs:
1) Symmetric Key Chain key symmKey_ck
   First time: output from DH ratchet
   Subsequent times: output from previous symmetric key ratchet

Generated:
2) input_key_material = SYMMKEY_CONSTANT = ZEROLEN
   No need for uniqueness. Symmetric keys never go out on the wire.
   TODO: Set a constant anyway?

Outputs:
1) N (the current session key number)
2) the session key
3) the next Symmetric Key Chain Key (KDF input for the next symmetric key ratchet)

// KDF_CK(ck, constant)
SYMMKEY_CONSTANT = ZEROLEN
// Output 1: Next chain key
keydata_0 = HKDF(symmKey_ck, SYMMKEY_CONSTANT, "SymmetricRatchet", 64)
symmKey_chainKey_0 = keydata_0[0:31]
// Output 2: The symmetric key
k_0 = keydata_0[32:63]

// repeat as necessary to get to k[n]
keydata_n = HKDF(symmKey_chainKey_(n-1), SYMMKEY_CONSTANT, "SymmetricRatchet", 64)
// Output 1: Next chain key
symmKey_chainKey_n = keydata_n[0:31]
// Output 2: The symmetric key
k_n = keydata_n[32:63]

Payload Section Decrypted data

Encrypted length is the remainder of the data. Decrypted length is 16 less than the encrypted length. All block types are supported. Typical contents include the following blocks:

Unencrypted data

There are zero or more blocks in the encrypted frame. Each block contains a one-byte identifier, a two-byte length, and zero or more bytes of data.

For extensibility, receivers MUST ignore blocks with unknown type nunmbers, and treat them as padding.

Encrypted data is 65535 bytes max, including a 16-byte authentication header, so the max unencrypted data is 65519 bytes.

(Poly1305 auth tag not shown):

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|blk |  size   |       data             |
+----+----+----+                        +
|                                       |
~               .   .   .               ~
|                                       |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|blk |  size   |       data             |
+----+----+----+                        +
|                                       |
~               .   .   .               ~
|                                       |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
~               .   .   .               ~

blk :: 1 byte
       0 datetime
       1-3 reserved
       4 termination
       5 options
       6 previous message number
       7 next session key
       8 ack
       9 ack request
       10 reserved
       11 Garlic Clove
       224-253 reserved for experimental features
       254 for padding
       255 reserved for future extension
size :: 2 bytes, big endian, size of data to follow, 0 - 65516
data :: the data

Maximum ChaChaPoly frame is 65535 bytes.
Poly1305 tag is 16 bytes
Maximum total block size is 65519 bytes
Maximum single block size is 65519 bytes
Block type is 1 byte
Block length is 2 bytes
Maximum single block data size is 65516 bytes.

Block Ordering Rules

In the New Session message, the DateTime block is required, and must be the first block.

Other allowed blocks:

• Garlic Clove (type 11)
• Options (type 5)
• Padding (type 254)

In the New Session Reply message, no blocks are required.

Other allowed blocks:

• Garlic Clove (type 11)
• Options (type 5)
• Padding (type 254)

No other blocks are allowed. Padding, if present, must be the last block.

In the Existing Session message, no blocks are required, and order is unspecified, except for the following requirements:

Termination, if present, must be the last block except for Padding. Padding, if present, must be the last block.

There may be multiple Garlic Clove blocks in a single frame. There may be up to two Next Key blocks in a single frame. Multiple Padding blocks are not allowed in a single frame. Other block types probably won't have multiple blocks in a single frame, but it is not prohibited.

DateTime

An expiration. Assists in reply prevention. Bob must validate that the message is recent, using this timestamp. Bob must implement a Bloom filter or other mechanism to prevent replay attacks, if the time is valid. Generally included in New Session messages only.

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
| 0  |    4    |     timestamp     |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+

blk :: 0
size :: 2 bytes, big endian, value = 4
timestamp :: Unix timestamp, unsigned seconds.
             Wraps around in 2106

Garlic Clove

A single decrypted Garlic Clove as specified in [I2NP], with modifications to remove fields that are unused or redundant. Warning: This format is significantly different than the one for ElGamal/AES. Each clove is a separate payload block. Garlic Cloves may not be fragmented across blocks or across ChaChaPoly frames.

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
| 11 |  size   |                        |
+----+----+----+                        +
|      Delivery Instructions            |
~                                       ~
~                                       ~
|                                       |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|type|  Message_ID       | Expiration
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
     |      I2NP Message body           |
+----+                                  +
~                                       ~
~                                       ~
|                                       |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+

size :: size of all data to follow

Delivery Instructions :: As specified in
       the Garlic Clove section of [I2NP]_.
       Length varies but is typically 1, 33, or 37 bytes

type :: I2NP message type

Message_ID :: 4 byte Integer I2NP message ID

Expiration :: 4 bytes, seconds since the epoch

Notes:

• Implementers must ensure that when reading a block, malformed or malicious data will not cause reads to overrun into the next block.
• The Clove Set format specified in [I2NP] is not used. Each clove is contained in its own block.
• The I2NP message header is 9 bytes, with an identical format to that used in [NTCP2].
• The Certificate, Message ID, and Expiration from the Garlic Message definition in [I2NP] are not included.
• The Certificate, Clove ID, and Expiration from the Garlic Clove definition in [I2NP] are not included.

Justification:

• The certificates were never used.
• The separate message ID and clove IDs were never used.
• The separate expirations were never used.
• The overall savings compared to the old Clove Set and Clove formats is approximately 35 bytes for 1 clove, 54 bytes for 2 cloves, and 73 bytes for 3 cloves.
• The block format is extensible and any new fields may be added as new block types.

Termination

Implementation is optional. Drop the session. This must be the last non-padding block in the frame. No more messages will be sent in this session.

Not allowed in NS or NSR. Only included in Existing Session messages.

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
| 4  |  size   | rsn|     addl data     |
+----+----+----+----+                   +
~               .   .   .               ~
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+

blk :: 4
size :: 2 bytes, big endian, value = 1 or more
rsn :: reason, 1 byte:
       0: normal close or unspecified
       1: termination received
       others: optional, impementation-specific
addl data :: optional, 0 or more bytes, for future expansion, debugging,
             or reason text.
             Format unspecified and may vary based on reason code.

Options

UNIMPLEMENTED, for further study. Pass updated options. Options include various parameters for the session. See the Session Tag Length Analysis section below for more information.

The options block may be variable length, as more_options may be present.

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
| 5  |  size   |ver |flg |STL |STimeout |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|  SOTW   |  RITW   |tmin|tmax|rmin|rmax|
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|  tdmy   |  rdmy   |  tdelay |  rdelay |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|              more_options             |
~               .   .   .               ~
|                                       |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+

blk :: 5
size :: 2 bytes, big endian, size of options to follow, 21 bytes minimum
ver :: Protocol version, must be 0
flg :: 1 byte flags
       bits 7-0: Unused, set to 0 for future compatibility
STL :: Session tag length (must be 8), other values unimplemented
STimeout :: Session idle timeout (seconds), big endian
SOTW :: Sender Outbound Tag Window, 2 bytes big endian
RITW :: Receiver Inbound Tag Window 2 bytes big endian

tmin, tmax, rmin, rmax :: requested padding limits
    tmin and rmin are for desired resistance to traffic analysis.
    tmax and rmax are for bandwidth limits.
    tmin and tmax are the transmit limits for the router sending this options block.
    rmin and rmax are the receive limits for the router sending this options block.
    Each is a 4.4 fixed-point float representing 0 to 15.9375
    (or think of it as an unsigned 8-bit integer divided by 16.0).
    This is the ratio of padding to data. Examples:
    Value of 0x00 means no padding
    Value of 0x01 means add 6 percent padding
    Value of 0x10 means add 100 percent padding
    Value of 0x80 means add 800 percent (8x) padding
    Alice and Bob will negotiate the minimum and maximum in each direction.
    These are guidelines, there is no enforcement.
    Sender should honor receiver's maximum.
    Sender may or may not honor receiver's minimum, within bandwidth constraints.

tdmy: Max dummy traffic willing to send, 2 bytes big endian, bytes/sec average
rdmy: Requested dummy traffic, 2 bytes big endian, bytes/sec average
tdelay: Max intra-message delay willing to insert, 2 bytes big endian, msec average
rdelay: Requested intra-message delay, 2 bytes big endian, msec average

more_options :: Format undefined, for future use

SOTW is the sender's recommendation to the receiver for the receiver's inbound tag window (the maximum lookahead). RITW is the sender's declaration of the inbound tag window (maximum lookahead) that he plans to use. Each side then sets or adjusts the lookahead based on some minimum or maximum or other calculation.

Notes:

• Support for non-default session tag length will hopefully never be required.
• The tag window is MAX_SKIP in the Signal documentation.

Issues:

• Options negotiation is TBD.
• Defaults TBD.
• Padding and delay options are copied from NTCP2, but those options have not been fully implemented or studied there.

Message Numbers

Implementation is optional. The length (number of messages sent) in the previous tag set (PN). Receiver may immediately delete tags higher than PN from the previous tag set. Receiver may expire tags less than or equal to PN from the previous tag set after a short time (e.g. 2 minutes).

+----+----+----+----+----+
 | 6  |  size   |  PN    |
+----+----+----+----+----+

 blk :: 6
 size :: 2
 PN :: 2 bytes big endian. The index of the last tag sent in the previous tag set.
 

Notes:

• Maximum PN is 65535.
• The definitions of PN is equal to the definition Signal, minus one. This is similar to what Signal does, but in Signal, PN and N are in the header. Here, they're in the encrypted message body.
• Do not send this block in tag set 0, because there was no previous tag set.

Next DH Ratchet Public Key

The next DH ratchet key is in the payload, and it is optional. We don't ratchet every time. (This is different than in signal, where it is in the header, and sent every time)

For the first ratchet, Key ID = 0.

Not allowed in NS or NSR. Only included in Existing Session messages.

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
| 7  |  size   |flag|  key ID |         |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+         +
|                                       |
+                                       +
|     Next DH Ratchet Public Key        |
+                                       +
|                                       |
+                             +----+----+
|                             |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+

blk :: 7
size :: 3 or 35
flag :: 1 byte flags
        bit order: 76543210
        bit 0: 1 for key present, 0 for no key present
        bit 1: 1 for reverse key, 0 for forward key
        bit 2: 1 to request reverse key, 0 for no request
               only set if bit 1 is 0
        bits 7-2: Unused, set to 0 for future compatibility
key ID :: The key ID of this key. 2 bytes, big endian
          0 - 32767
Public Key :: The next X25519 public key, 32 bytes, little endian
              Only if bit 0 is 1

Notes:

• Key ID is an incrementing counter for the local key used for that tag set, starting at 0.
• The ID must not change unless the key changes.
• It may not be strictly necessary, but it's useful for debugging. Signal does not use a key ID.
• The maximum Key ID is 32767.
• In the rare case that the tag sets in both directions are ratcheting at the same time, a frame will contain two Next Key blocks, one for the forward key and one for the reverse key.
• Key and tag set ID numbers must be sequential.
• See the DH Ratchet section above for details.

Ack

This is only sent if an ack request block was received. Multiple acks may be present to ack multiple messages.

Not allowed in NS or NSR. Only included in Existing Session messages.

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
| 8  |  size   |tagsetid |   N     |    |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+    +
|             more acks                 |
~               .   .   .               ~
|                                       |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+

blk :: 8
size :: 4 * number of acks to follow, minimum 1 ack
for each ack:
tagsetid :: 2 bytes, big endian, from the message being acked
N :: 2 bytes, big endian, from the message being acked

Notes:

• The tag set ID and N uniquely identify the message being acked.
• In the first tag sets used for a session in each direction, the tag set ID is 0.
• No NextKey blocks have been sent, so there are no key IDs.
• For all tag sets used after NextKey exchanges, The tag set number is (1 + Alice's key ID + Bob's key ID).

Ack Request

Request an in-band ack. To replace the out-of-band DeliveryStatus Message in the Garlic Clove.

If an explicit ack is requested, the current tagset ID and message number (N) are returned in an ack block.

Not allowed in NS or NSR. Only included in Existing Session messages.

+----+----+----+----+
|  9 |  size   |flg |
+----+----+----+----+

blk :: 9
size :: 1
flg :: 1 byte flags
       bits 7-0: Unused, set to 0 for future compatibility

Padding

All padding is inside AEAD frames. TODO Padding inside AEAD should roughly adhere to the negotiated parameters. TODO Alice sent her requested tx/rx min/max parameters in the NS message. TODO Bob sent his requested tx/rx min/max parameters in the NSR message. Updated options may be sent during the data phase. See options block information above.

If present, this must be the last block in the frame.

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
|254 |  size   |      padding           |
+----+----+----+                        +
|                                       |
~               .   .   .               ~
|                                       |
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+

blk :: 254
size :: 2 bytes, big endian, 0-65516
padding :: zeros or random data

Notes:

• All-zero padding is fine, as it will be encrypted.
• Padding strategies TBD.
• Padding-only frames are allowed.
• Padding default is 0-15 bytes.
• See options block for padding parameter negotiation
• See options block for min/max padding parameters
• Router response on violation of negotiated padding is implementation-dependent.

Other block types

Implementations should ignore unknown block types for forward compatibility.

Future work

• The padding length is either to be decided on a per-message basis and estimates of the length distribution, or random delays should be added. These countermeasures are to be included to resist DPI, as message sizes would otherwise reveal that I2P traffic is being carried by the transport protocol. The exact padding scheme is an area of future work, Appendix A provides more information on the topic.

X25519 Only

On a tunnel that is solely used with this protocol, do identification as is done currently with ElGamal/AES+SessionTags:

First, treat the initial data as a session tag, and look up the session tag. If found, decrypt using the stored data associated with that session tag.

If not found, treat the initial data as a DH public key and nonce. Perform a DH operation and the specified KDF, and attempt to decrypt the remaining data.

X25519 Shared with ElGamal/AES+SessionTags

On a tunnel that supports both this protocol and ElGamal/AES+SessionTags, classify incoming messages as follows:

Due to a flaw in the ElGamal/AES+SessionTags specification, the AES block is not padded to a random non-mod-16 length. Therefore, the length of Existing Session messages mod 16 is always 0, and the length of New Session messages mod 16 is always 2 (since the ElGamal block is 514 bytes long).

If the length mod 16 is not 0 or 2, treat the initial data as a session tag, and look up the session tag. If found, decrypt using the stored data associated with that session tag.

If not found, and the length mod 16 is not 0 or 2, treat the initial data as a DH public key and nonce. Perform a DH operation and the specified KDF, and attempt to decrypt the remaining data. (based on the relative traffic mix, and the relative costs of X25519 and ElGamal DH operations, ths step may be done last instead)

Otherwise, if the length mod 16 is 0, treat the initial data as a ElGamal/AES session tag, and look up the session tag. If found, decrypt using the stored data associated with that session tag.

If not found, and the data is at least 642 (514 + 128) bytes long, and the length mod 16 is 2, treat the initial data as a ElGamal block. Attempt to decrypt the remaining data.

Note that if the ElGamal/AES+SessionTag spec is updated to allow non-mod-16 padding, things will need to be done differently.

ElGamal/AES+SessionTags

New session message, same each direction:

ElGamal block:
514 bytes

AES block:
- 2 byte tag count
- 1024 bytes of tags (32 typical)
- 4 byte payload size
- 32 byte hash of payload
- 1 byte flags
- 1 byte clove count
- 33 byte Garlic deliv. inst.
- 16 byte I2NP header
- 15 byte clove cert, id, exp.
- 15 byte msg cert, id, exp.
- 0 byte padding assuming 1936 byte message
1143 total

Total:
1657 bytes

Existing session messages, same each direction:

AES block:
- 32 byte session tag
- 2 byte tag count
- 4 byte payload size
- 32 byte hash of payload
- 1 byte flags
- 1 byte clove count
- 33 byte Garlic deliv. inst.
- 16 byte I2NP header
- 15 byte msg cert, id, exp.
- 15 byte clove cert, id, exp.
- 0 byte padding assuming 1936 byte message
151 total

Four message total (two each direction)
3616 bytes overhead

ECIES-X25519-AEAD-Ratchet

Alice-to-Bob New Session message:

- 32 byte ephemeral public key
- 32 byte static public key
- 16 byte Poly1305 MAC
- 7 byte DateTime block
- 3 byte Garlic block overhead
- 9 byte I2NP header
- 33 byte Garlic deliv. inst.
- 16 byte Poly1305 MAC

Total:
148 bytes overhead

Bob-to-Alice New Session Reply message:

- 8 byte session tag
- 32 byte ephemeral public key
- 16 byte Poly1305 MAC
- 3 byte Garlic block overhead
- 9 byte I2NP header
- 33 byte Garlic deliv. inst.
- 16 byte Poly1305 MAC

Total:
117 bytes overhead

Existing session messages, same each direction:

- 8 byte session tag
- 3 byte Garlic block overhead
- 9 byte I2NP header
- 33 byte Garlic deliv. inst.
- 16 byte Poly1305 MAC

Total:
69 bytes

Comparison

Four message total (two each direction):

372 bytes
90% (approx. 10x) reduction compared to ElGamal/AES+SessionTags

Handshake only:

ElGamal: 1657 + 1657 = 3314 bytes
Ratchet: 148 _ 117 = 265 bytes
92% (approx. 12x) reduction compared to ElGamal/AES+SessionTags

Long-term total (ignoring handshakes):

ElGamal: 151 + 32 byte tag sent previously = 183 bytes
Ratchet: 69 bytes
64% (approx. 3x) reduction compared to ElGamal/AES+SessionTags

Alternate

Using twice the sessions per second (128) and twice the tag window (64), we have 4 times the tags (7.4 million). Max for one in a million chance of collision is 6.1 million tags. 12 byte (or even 10 byte) tags would add a huge margin.

However, is the one in a million chance of collision a good target? Much larger than the chance of being dropped along the way is not much use. The false-positive target for Java's DecayingBloomFilter is roughly 1 in 10,000, but even 1 in 1000 isn't of grave concern. By reducing the target to 1 in 10,000, there's plenty of margin with 8 byte tags.

Storage

The sender generates tags and keys on the fly, so there is no storage. This cuts overall storage requirements in half compared to ElGamal/AES. ECIES tags are 8 bytes instead of 32 for ElGamal/AES. This cuts overall storage requirements by another factor of 4. Per-tag session keys are not stored at the receiver except for "gaps", which are minimal for reasonable loss rates.

The 33% reduction in tag expiration time creates another 33% savings, assuming short session times.

Therefore, the total space savings vs. ElGamal/AES is a factor of 10.7, or 92%.

I2CP Options

This section is copied from [Prop123].

Option in SessionConfig Mapping:

i2cp.leaseSetEncType=nnn[,nnn]  The encryption types to be used.
                                0: ElGamal
                                1-3: See proposal 145
                                4: This proposal.

Create Leaseset2 Message

This proposal requires LS2 which is supported as of release 0.9.38. No changes are required to the [I2CP] specifications. All support was designed, specified, and implemented in [Prop123] implemented in 0.9.38.